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Vostract
Previous evidence bv Aliber and Stickney [1975] indicates
that exchange rates of most foreign countries move congruently
with changes in price levels. Accordingly, Aliber and Sticknev
concluded that the validity of the Purchasing Power Paritv theorem
increases in the long run and fixed assets of foreign subsidiaries
are not exposed to exchange risk. Their results support the
practice of using historical cost and historical exchange rates
for valuation of nonmonetary assets. This paper reports the
results of extending the analysis for a longer period of time and
focusing only on hyper-inflationary countries. By appealing to
the Purchasing Power Parity theory to determine the appropriate
exchange rate given the experienced inflation, the results
indicate that fifteen of the eighteen hyper-inflationary countries
have significant exchange risk and, therefore, the use of
historical costs and historical exchange rates (as required by
SFAS #52) is inappropriate.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
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University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
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1 .0 Introduction
The accounting for foreign operations and the reporting of
exposure to potential exchange risk has great implications for
many multinational corporations (^NCs) and their investors. The
financial statements of MNCs are intended to provide one source
of information regarding the effects of exposure to exchange risk,
However, the accounting requirements of SFA.S #52 fail to fully
disclose exposure to exchange risk. This occurs since the
implied assumptions, inherent in the required accounting
practices, regarding the comovements of exchange rates with price
level changes are not met in many hyper-inflationary economies.
This study empirically investigates the implicit
assumptions of SFA.S #52 in situations of hyper-inflation. The
assumption that balance sheet items translated at the historical
exchange rate are not exposed to exchange gains or losses is
empirically shown to be false through application of the
Purchasing Power Parity theorem. The empirical evidence supports
the notion that most hyper-inflationary foreign countries
svstematicallv experience exchange risk exposure.
In the next section of this paper, the reporting
requirements of SFA.S #52 in hyper-inflationarv economies and a
brief discussion of the Purchasing Power Parity theorem are
provided. The third section reports the empirical evidence
regarding the long run validitv of the purchasing Power Paritv
theorem for eighteen countries which meet the SFA.S hyper-
inflation criterion. Countries in which favorable or unfavorable
systematic exchange risk exposure exists are identified for a
number of hyper-inflationary countries. Examples regarding the
effects of this problem on the balance sheet valuations of
multinational corporations are demonstrated in the fourth
section. The implications of the empirical results and a summary
are discussed in the final section.
2.0 Background
FASB Statement Number 52 was accepted by the accounting
community as a replacement for FASB Statement Number 8 because it
seemed to alleviate the reporting problems of SFAS #8. However,
other problems, such as exchange risk exposure, were overlooked
by the new pronouncement.
SFAS #8 was very controversial and was attacked on the
grounds that it required firms to report foreign currency
translation gains or losses in the income statement. Many people
believed that the reporting requirements of SFAS #8 had little
correspondence with the actual economic condition of the firm.
To supposedly achieve compatability of the reported results with
the economic situation, SFAS #52 allows a firm the discretion
(within certain guidelines) to select the foreign subsidiary's
functional currency. The functional currency selected then
determines the accounting method to be employed.
The required accounting practices of SFAS #52 can be
summarized as follows:
(1) If the foreign subsidiary is deemed to be a conduit
for U.S. operations in the foreign country or an extension of the
domestic operations, the functional currency is the U.S. dollar.
The accounting treatment in this case requires the monetarv
assets and liabilities of the foreign operations to be translated
at the current rate of exchange, revenues and expenses to be
translated at the rate of exchange at the time of the
transaction, and nonmonetary items are kept at the historical
cost/historical rate of exchange. Gains and losses on the
foreign currency adjustments are recognized in the income
statement and the monetary balance sheet items are carried in the
consolidated balance sheet at the current exchange rate.
Nonmonetary items remain at the historical cost and historical
rate of exchange in the consolidated balance sheet.
(2) If the foreign subsidiary is deemed to be a relatively
self-supporting entity, the functional currency is the currency
of the foriegn country. The foreign subsidiary's income
statement is consolidated with the parent at the current rate of
exchange and no gains or losses on foreign currency translation
are recognized in the income statement. The balance sheet of the
foreign subsidiary is consolidated with the parent at the
historical cost adjusted for the current exchange rate.
(3) If the foreign subsidiary operates in a country that
has experienced a cumulative inflation rate over a three year
period equal to or greater than 100%, the functional currency is
required by SFA.S #52 to be the U.S. dollar and the accounting
requirements are the same as for (1) above. Gains or losses
on monetary assets and liabilities are included in income while
nonmonetary items remain at the historical cost and historical
rate of exchange.
\ccordingly, in instances in which hyper-inflation exists,
the nonmonetary items are carried at the original cost and the
original historical exchange rate. In essence, it is assumed
that nonmonetary items are not exposed to exchange gains or
losses since any exchange gain or loss would be offset by a
change in the local currency price of the asset. As \liber and
Stickney [19751 point out, the use of the historical exchange
rate for nonmonetary items is based on the belief that exchange
gains and losses are offset by changes in the local currency
prices of the nonmonetary items. This failure to consider the
ootential exchange risk for nonmonetary items presumes that the
Purchasing Power Parity theory does hold.
The Purchasing Power Parity theory ties the change in the
foreign exchange rate between two countries to the change in
price levels for the two countries. Changes in the equilibrium
exchange rate are proportional to changes in the ratio of foreign
to domestic prices. Lee [1976] and Officer [1982] provide a
current and extensive review of the Purchasing Power Parity
theory.
Aliber and Stickney [1975] investigated the validity of the
Purchasing Power Parity theory for 48 countries over the 1960 to
1971 time period. They concluded, that over fairly long time
periods, the validity of the Purchasing Power Parity theory
increases and that most assets and liabilities are not exposed to
exchange gains and losses. However, Miber and Stickney [1975]
did not focus on hyper-inflationary countries and their
technique to measure the parity error, on which thev base their
conclusion, may be suspect.
Intuitively, one might expect to observe larger deviations
between actual exchange rates and the theoretically determined
parity exchange rates in countries with extremely high rates of
inflation. These countries may undertake practices to
keep their exchange rates higher than the purchasing power parity
implied exchange rate or lower than parity if it is in their self
interest to do so. If this does occur, one would expect to find
the Purchasing Power Parity theory to be less valid in these
hyper-inflationary countries and, therefore, the required use of
historical cost and historical exchange rates to be
inappropriate. In addition, systematic favorable long term
exchange risk exposure will result in countries which keep their
exchange rates lower than parity. Systematic unfavorable
exchange risk exposure will occur when countries allow their
exchange rate to rise higher than the implied parity rate.
Evidence regarding the validity of the Purchasing Power Parity
theory for hyper-inflationary countries as well as evidence of
systematic favorable or unfavorable exchange risk exposure for
long term assets is provided in the following section.
3.0 Empirical Evidence
Consumer price change information for 121 countries is
surveyed from 1955 through 19R3 in order to determine those
countries which meet the SFA.S #52 criterion for hyper-inflation.
Table 1 provides a list of 13 countries which meet the criterion
of a cumulative inflation rate of 100^ over a three year period.
The years of analysis are provided since information for all 2S
years is not available for all countries. Table 1 also provides
the average inflation rate as well as the high and low yearly
rate. For comparative purposes, the U.S. average inflation rate
during the 1955-1933 period is 4.7% with a high of 13.5% and a
low of -.3%.
INSERT TABLE 1
In order to determine the contemporaneity of meeting the
SFA.S #52 criterion, an additional analysis is conducted to
determine the time periods in which the hyper-inflationary
criterion is met. Sixteen of the countries meet the criterion
during the 1980's and twelve during the 1970's. Ten of the
countries meet the criterion during both the 1970's and the
1980's while none of the countries meet the criterion only prior
to 1970. This implies that the hyper-inflation situation is
contemporary in most of the countries. Table 2 summarizes the
results.
INSERT TABLE 2
For each of the 18 countries the purchasing power parity
exchange rate is computed based on the relative changes in
inflation and the previous year's actual ending exchange rate.
This extends the analysis of ATiber and Stickney [1975] for
eleven of the hyper-inflationary countries. The purchasing power
parity exchange rate is computed as:
E
t_ 1
* (1 + I f ) / (1 + I d ) (1)
where E. •, is the exchange rate at the end of the previous year,
If is the current year consumer price level change for the
foreign country, and I, is the current year consumer price
level change in the United States. The computed parity error is
the actual end of the current year exchange rate less the implied
purchasing power parity exchange rate. Table 3 provides summary
information regarding the number of years in which the error is
positive or negative, the total error over the perriod of
analysis, the average error, the cumulative % error, and the
average % error.
INSERT TABLE 3
These results are fairly consistent with the findings of
AJLiber and Stickney [1975]. In most instances the parity errors
are not systematically positive or negative and the average %
error is quite small. This evidence seems to support the notion
that the Purchasing Power Parity theorem holds in the long run
and that there is little systematic exchange risk exposure.
However, this method of computing the implied purchasing
power parity exchange rate treats every year as independent since
the computation assumes that the beginning exchange rate (last
year's end of the year rate) has been appropriately adjusted for
changes in price levels that occurred in the preceding year.
Accordingly, the parity error is only based on results for a
single year and the error does not take into consideration any
uncorrected parity errors from previous periods. The average
% error is somewhat biased (understates the deviation from
parity) when it is used to determine the existence of exchange
risk on a long term basis. It portrays the average yearly
exchange risk exposure and not the yearly average exchange risk
exposure
.
For example, assume a country experiences a rapid change in
relative inflation during year 1 but no adjustment is
experienced in the exchange rate. In the following vears, the
exchange rate is adjusted on a basis consistent with the relative
price level changes for each of the following years but the
initial price level changes are ignored. Using the above method
of determining the purchasing power parity error would indicate a
small average % error as the number of years increases. However,
the difference between the actual exchange rate and the parity
exchange rate based on the cumulative changes in relative
inflation could be quite large. This cumulative effect must be
considered in the evaluation of long term exchange risk exposure.
A.s previous evidence indicates [Lee, 1976; Officer, 1982],
the actual adjustment to parity may not occur in a single year
but it may take place over a number of years. In instances such
as this, one must consider the cumulative relative price level
changes rather than the price level changes in each individual
year. The exchange risk for a long term asset should be measured
over the total life of the asset and it should portray the
difference between the actual exchange rate and the parity
exchange rate computed as if the exchange rate is appropriately
and completely adjusted each year. Accordingly, the parity
exchange rate to be used in the evaluation of long term exchange
risk exposure should be computed as:
E*
t_ 1
* (1 + If ) / (1 + Id ) (2)
where E
t , is the implied parity exchange rate at the end of the
previous year, L is the current year consumer price level
change for the foreign country, and I, is the current year
consumer price level change in the United States. The parity
error is computed as previously described. This parity error
computation provides a measure of the cumulative long term error
that exists throughout the period of analysis. Failure of the
exchange rate to adjust completely in one year (for the price
level changes in that year) is carried through multiple years
until a catch-up adjustment may occur. If no catch-up adjustment
occurs, the parity errors of previous periods remain in the error
computation and the measure is appropriate for the analysis of
long run exchange risk exposure.
The parity error is recomputed for all 18 countries using
the cumulative parity approach. The results of this analysis,
provided in Table 4, are quite different than the previous
findings.
INSERT TABLE 4
In most of the hyper-inflationary countries a significant
difference is observed (both yearly and on a cumulative basis)
between the actual exchange rate and the parity exchange rate.
Of the 18 countries, 15 experience an average % parity error
greater than 10%. The countries in which the average % parity
error is greater than 10% include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Costa Rica, Ghana, Iceland, Israel, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Somalia, Turkey, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. These results
indicate that the Purchasing Power Parity theory is much less
valid when cumulative inflation effects are considered. Only
three countries can be classified as not being exposed to
exchange risk over the period of analysis; Bangladesh, peru, and
Sierra Leone.
In addition, many of the countries experience a systematic
favorable or unfavorable long run exchange risk exposure over the
analysis period. Of the 15 countries in which a significant
average % parity error is observed, 7 countries experience a
negative systematic average parity error. They are Argentina,
Ghana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Somalia, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. This
situation (negative parity errors) occurs when the actual
exchange rate for the domestic currency to the U.S. dollar is
less than the implied purchasing power exchange rate. This
leads to a favorable exchange risk exposure situation assuming
that the price level in the foreign country of the fixed asset
rises at the inflation rate. The relative price level of the
asset rises faster than the exchange rate and the multinational
corporation actually prospers from the situation. A. numerical
illustration of this situation is provided In Section £.
Eight of the countries have a systematically positive
parity error over the period of analysis. In these countries the
actual exchange rate of the foreign currency for U.S. dollars
is greater than that implied by the Purchasing Power Parity
theorem. The actual exchange rate increases more rapidly than
the relative price level. In this case, the multinational
corporation is exposed to unfavorable exchange risk. The
countries in which the evidence indicates systematic unfavorable
exchange risk include Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa R.ica,
Iceland, Israel, Turkey, and Zaire. A. summary of the exchange
risk exposure of all 18 countries is provided in Table 5.
INSERT TABLE 5
Countries in which the long run cumulative validity of Che
Purchasing Power Parity theorem is suspect are not accurately
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portraying economic reality in their balance sheets. Through
valuation of a foreign subsidiary's fixed assets at the
historical cost and historical exchange rate, exposure to
exchange risk is completely ignored and the asset's value may be
systematically over- or understated. An illustration of
favorable, unfavorable, and insignificant exchange risk exposure
and its effect on the valuation of a fixed asset for financial
reporting purposes is provided in the next section.
4.0 An Illustration Regarding the Effect of Exchange Risk on the
Valuation of Fixed Assets
Assume that XYZ Corporation simultaneously purchases fixed
assets in three different countries experiencing hyper-inflation.
At the time of purchase the U.S. dollar value for each of the
purchases is $100.00. The exchange rates for the three
countries are:
Country A: 3.5 local currency units to $1.00
Country B: 20 local currency units to $1.00
Country C: 1 local currency unit to $1.00
The purchases in foreign currency units are:
Country A: 350.00
Country B: 2000.00
Country C: 100.00
Let us assume that there is 10% inflation in all three of
the foreign countries and (for siraplicitv) there is no inflation
in the United States. In Country A the actual exchange rate
rises to 4.50 units to $1.00. The purchasing power parity
implied exchange rate for Country A should be 3.35 units to $1.00
1 1
C 3.5 * (1 + .10) /( 1 + .0)}. The parity error is positive and the
firm has experienced exposure to unfavorable exchange risk.
Given that the price level of the fixed asset rises at the
inflation rate of 10%, the corporation could sell the asset in the
foreign market for 385.00 which has a current exchange value in
U.S. dollars of $85.50; the firm has experienced an economic loss
of $14.50. Recall that for financial reporting purposes the
asset would be valued at "5100.00. The reporting requirements of
SFA.S #52 overstate the value of a fixed asset in situations of
unfavorable long term exchange risk exposure.
In Country B the exchange rate rises during the period from
20.00 to 21.00 units per $1.00. In this instance a negative
parity error occurs since the actual exchange rate is less than
the parity exchange rate. The parity exchange rate is 22.00
units per $1.00 (20.00 * (1 + .10)/(1 + .0)}. In such
situations, the corporation is exposed to favorable exchange
risk. The price of the asset at the end of the period in the
foreign currency is 2200.00 units. However, given the actual
exchange rate of 21.00, the asset could be sold in the foreign
market for 2200.00 which can be translated into U.S. currency as
S 104. 76. The corporation has experienced an economic gain but
the reporting requirements fail to Hisclose this event in any way
on the firm's financial statements.
In Country C the exchange rate rises to 1.10 per S 1.00 and
the Purhasing Power Parity theorem holds; the firm is not exposed
to foreign exchange risk. In this situation, the price of the
asset rises to 110.00 but this increase in the price of the asset
is offset by the increase in the exchange rate. The reported
12
value on the balance sheet of $100.00 is apporpriate since there
is no exposure to exchange risk during the period.
These three cases illustrate the three possible scenarios
regarding the exposure of fixed assets to exchange risk. Indeed,
as Aliber and Stickney [1975] point out, when there is no
exchange risk (Country C) it is quite appropriate to use the
historical cost and historical exchange rate for balance sheet
valuation. However, when the Purchasing Power Parity theorem
does not hold (Countries A. and B), fixed assets are exposed to
exchange risk and the current reporting practices of SFA.S #52 for
subsidiaries in hyper-inflationary countries are deficient.
5.0 Summary and Conclusions
Using a cumulative perspective regarding price level changes
and the Purchasing Power Parity theorem to measure the parity
exchange rate error, this paper provides evidence which does not
support the notion that fixed assets of subsidiaries operating in
hyper-inflationary countries are not exposed to exchange risk.
For most hyper-inflationary countries there is a large deviation
between the actual exchange rate and an implied exchange rate
that takes into consideration previous price level changes.
Exposure to exchange risk exists for 15 of the 13 countries which
meet the hyper-inflation criterion of SFA.S #52. Seven of the
countries have a favorable exchange risk exposure since the
actual exchange rate is less than the implied paritv exchange
rate. Unfavorable exchange exposure, the actual exchange rate is
greater than the implied parity rate, occurs in R of the hvper-
inflationary countries.
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These results contradict the findings of Miber and
Stickney [1975] and imply that the reporting requirements of SF4.S
#52 fail to consider exchange risk exposure in hyper-inflationary
countries. To the extent to which the functional currency is the
U.S. dollar and to the extent that exchange risk exposure exists
in non-hyper-inflationary countries, the results of this study
are generalizable to other foreign (non-hyper-inflationary)
countries. The use of historical costs and historical exchange
rates in financial reporting of fixed assets ignores exchange
risk exposure and leads to mis-valuation of nonmonetary items on
the statement of financial position.
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Table 1 . Hyper-Inflationary Countries
^—
—
^^^^—^^^^—
Country Time
Period
r
Average
Inflation
Rate
High Low
Argentina 1955-1983 73.2% 443.2% 7.7%
Bangladesh 1972-1983 20.0% 54.7% - 9.6%
Bolivia 1955-1983 37.9% 275.6% - .7%
Brazil 1955-1983 44.0% 142.0% 10.0%
Chile 1964-1983 100.3% 504.7% 9.9%
Costa Rica 1955-1983 10.6% 90.1% - .7%
Ghana 1955-1983 27.2% 122.9% - 8.5%
Iceland 1955-1983 23.5% 86.0% 3.0%
Israel 1955-1983 31.6% 145.6% 1.7%
Mexico 1955-1983 14.8% 101.9% .6%
Nicaragua 1973-1983 20.9% 48.2% 2.8%
Peru 1955-1983 24.5% 111.2% 4.8%
Sierra Leone 1955-1983 10.2% 69.7% - 3.7%
Somalia 1955-1983 10.9% 58.8% - 7.5%
Turkey 1955-1983 19.5% 110.2% .4%
Uruguay 1955-1983 51.2% 125.3% 10.9%
Yugoslavia 1955-1983 15.9% 39.7% 1.4%
Zaire 1955-1983 25.7% 108.6% - 2.7%
Table 2. Time Periods in Which the Hyper-Inflation Criterion are
Met
Country 1950's* 1960's 1970's 1980's**
Argentina X X X
Bangladesh X
Bolivia X X X
Brazil X X X
Chile X
Costa Rica X
Ghana X X
Iceland X X
Israel X X
Mexico X
Nicaragua X
Peru X X
Sierra Leone X
Somalia X
Turkey X X
Uruguay X X X
Yugoslavia X
Zaire X X X
1950's is limited to 1955-1959
**
1980's is limited to 19S0-19S3
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Table 5. Hyper-Inflationary Countries and the Exposure to Long
Run Exchange Risk
Insignificant Favorable Unfavorable
Exposure Exposure Exposure
Bangladesh Argentina Bolivia
Peru Ghana Brazil
Sierra Leone Mexico Chile
Nicaragua Costa Rica
Somalia Iceland
Uruguay Israel
Yugoslavia Turkey
Zaire
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